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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3901 
___________ 
 
JOHN DAVID MINCH, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-15-cv-00303) 
District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 20, 2017 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 15, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 John David Minch appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for summary judgment and 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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granting the Commissioner of Social Security’s (Commissioner) motion for summary 
judgment in an action seeking disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental 
security income (SSI).  We will affirm. 
 In January 2008, Minch filed an application for benefits based on lower back disc 
problems and mental health conditions.  Based on the evidence in the record, and the 
report of an independent physician, Dr. Gabriel Sella, the Social Security Administration 
denied Minch’s claim initially and on reconsideration.  Minch requested a hearing, which 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted in July 2010.1  The ALJ concluded that 
Minch was not disabled.  After the Appeals Counsel denied Minch’s request for review, 
he filed a complaint in the District Court.  The District Court remanded the matter “[i]n 
an abundance of caution” because Dr. Sella’s report stated that Minch should undergo 
“further [medical] investigation with regards to his low back pain.”   
 On remand, the ALJ collected additional medical records, questioned Minch about 
the medical treatment he had received, and heard testimony from an independent 
vocational expert.  Then, applying the five-step, sequential analysis for determining 
whether a claimant is disabled, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, the ALJ concluded that (1) Minch 
was not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, November 2, 
2005; (2) Minch’s disc disease and depression, among other conditions, were severe 
                                              
1 At that time, Minch was awaiting trial on charges of murdering his ex-wife.  He was 
convicted in November 2015, and is now serving a life sentence.  We note that a claimant 
is not eligible for SSI benefits for any month during which he is an inmate of a public 
institution.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(1)(A).  Similarly, a claimant cannot collect DIB 
payments for any month during which he is incarcerated “pursuant to his conviction of a 
criminal offense.”  42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1)(A)(i). 
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impairments; (3) Minch did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 
was the same or equivalent to an impairment listed by the Social Security Administration 
as presumptively precluding any gainful activity; (4) Minch was unable to perform his 
past relevant work as a pizza delivery driver and janitor; and (5) Minch possessed 
sufficient residual functional capacity to perform light work.  Consequently, the ALJ 
concluded that Minch was not disabled.  The Appeals Counsel again denied Minch’s 
request for review.   
 Minch next filed a civil action in the District Court, naming the Commissioner as 
the defendant.  The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  The District Court 
denied Minch’s motion and granted the Commissioner’s motion, concluding that the 
ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.  In particular, the District Court 
held that the ALJ conducted adequate further investigation and adequately explained the 
reasons for the weight afforded to the medical opinions.  Minch appealed.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “The role of this Court is 
identical to that of the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 
(3d Cir. 1999); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  Substantial evidence is ‘“more than a mere 
scintilla,’” and is defined as “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate.’”  Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427 (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 
(3d Cir. 1995)).  If the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we 
are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual inquiry 
differently.  Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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 To qualify for disability benefits, “a claimant must demonstrate [that] there is 
some ‘medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him from engaging 
in any ‘substantial gainful activity’ for a statutory twelve-month period.’”  Plummer, 186 
F.3d at 427 (quoting Stunkard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d 
Cir. 1988)).  A claimant is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity “only if his 
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only 
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work 
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the 
national economy.”  Id. at 427-28 (quotation marks omitted).    
 In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner considers “all … 
symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which [these] symptoms can reasonably be 
accepted as consistent with objective medical evidence ….”  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 
416.929(a).  When evaluating subjective complaints of disabling symptoms, the ALJ 
must assess the persistence and intensity of the claimant’s pain as well as the extent to 
which it impairs his ability to work.  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1).   
Allegations of disabling symptoms must be consistent with objective medical evidence, 
and the ALJ must explain why any allegations were rejected.  See Burnett v. Comm’r of 
Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Minch argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate his subjective complaints.2  
In particular, he alleges that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s 
                                              
2 In making this argument, Minch asserts that the “ALJ’s findings regarding the intensity, 
or degree, of pain [are] absolutely irrelevant.”  In support of this position, Minch relies on 
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determination that his complaints about his physical impairments were contradicted by 
objective medical evidence.  Minch claimed that he experienced constant pain.  The ALJ 
noted, however, that Minch’s “treatment has been minimal and inconsistent.”  Between 
the onset date and his incarceration in 2009, Minch was examined for physical ailments 
only in October 2007, March 2008, and September 2008.  Based on the reports from 
those examinations, the ALJ concluded that the record indicated “generally normal 
physical examination findings.”3  In addition, the ALJ relied on Minch’s 
acknowledgement that various medications were successfully treating his neuropathic 
pain and diabetes.  Furthermore, the ALJ credited the opinion of the state agency medical 
consultant, Dr. Atiya Lateef, which was affirmed by another doctor at the reconsideration 
level of administrative review.  See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 
(3d Cir. 2011) (noting that “[s]tate agent opinions merit significant consideration.”).  Dr. 
Lateef examined the medical record and concluded that Minch could perform a range of 
                                                                                                                                                  
Garrison v. Colvin, where the Ninth Circuit explained that, under its “credit-as-true” rule, 
a court may credit evidence as true and remand for an immediate award of benefits when, 
inter alia, the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence.  
759 F.3d 995, 1019-21 (9th Cir. 2014).  We decline to apply that rule here.   
 
3 The 2007 examination report indicated “muscular skeletal normal appearance from 
lumbar” and negative results from straight leg raises and deep tendon reflexes.  Minch 
was prescribed Ibuprofen.  In March 2008, Minch was examined by Dr. Sella in 
connection with his benefits application.  Dr. Sella reported that the “clinical examination 
… was entirely negative,”  noting that Minch “walked in and out of the room without 
difficulty” and “got on and off the table without difficulty.”  Dr. Sella also stated that 
Minch was able to squat, hop, and perform a tandem walk, as well as a toe and heal walk.  
Additional testing in September 2008, including an EMG and MRI, revealed “multilevel 
degenerative disc changes with [mild] diffuse bulging discs.  No focal disc herniation or 
spinal stenosis.” 
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light work with limited exposure to extreme cold, vibration, and hazards.  The ALJ 
afforded “great weight” to Dr. Lateef’s opinion because it was “generally consistent with 
the evidence of record, including the MRI and EMG findings, the physical examination 
findings showing a full range of motion of [Minch’s] back and full strength of his lower 
extremities, and his conservative treatment.”  Under these circumstances, we conclude 
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s ruling that Minch could perform limited 
work activities despite his physical impairments.   
 Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Minch’s depression 
and personality disorder were not severe mental health impairments.  Minch was 
hospitalized in December 2007 for mental health treatment after losing custody of his 
daughter.  He was treated with an antidepressant and discharged in a stable condition 
approximately 10 days later.  Thereafter, Minch was seen regularly by a psychiatrist, Dr. 
Steven Corder, who prescribed medications that were effective.4  Expert agency 
psychological consultants opined that Minch retained the capacity for competitive 
employment with short and simple instructions and low social, pressure, and adaptive 
demands.   
                                              
4 In March 2008, at Minch’s initial appointment, he presented with some mental status 
abnormalities, but he described “no specific symptoms” the next month.  By June 2008, 
he presented with a generally normal mental state.  Despite some fatigue, modest mental 
status findings, and “situational difficulties,” Minch’s mental status was essential normal 
in November and December 2008.  In March 2009, which was just prior to Minch’s 
arrest, Dr. Corder observed that Minch had an unkempt appearance, failed to make eye 
contact, and was “not able to work.”  Since his incarceration, prison records indicate that 
Minch’s mental state has been generally stable. 
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 Minch’s challenges to the ALJ’s conclusions lack merit.  For instance, he argues 
that the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Corder’s assessment that he was “not able to work.”  
But that assessment occurred in March 2009, when Minch was experiencing stress from 
his imminent arrest, and it conflicts with Dr. Corder’s reports that Minch’s mental state 
was otherwise stable.  Moreover, Dr. Corder’s comment is not entitled to special 
significance because whether Minch is able to work is an issue reserved for the ALJ.  See 
Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1527(e)(3)).   
 Minch also believes that the ALJ “mischaracterized [his] answers” on a 
questionnaire pertaining to his ability to perform activities of daily living.  We disagree.  
Although Minch’s answers reflect that he had some difficulty performing certain tasks, 
such as leaning over a sink to shave, tying his shoes, and mowing the lawn, he did report 
that he was able to do laundry and vacuum, prepare meals for himself, maintain his 
finances, and keep appointments.  Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 
determination that Minch “has mild limitations in his activities of daily living.”5   
 Finally, Minch argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the vocational 
expert’s responses to hypothetical questions.  See Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 
                                              
5 There is also no merit to Minch’s suggestion that the ALJ relied solely on his ability to 
perform activities of daily living in concluding that he did not have an impairment that 
met or equaled a disabling impairment listed in the applicable regulations.  See 20 C.F.R. 
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §§ 12.04 and 12.08.  The restriction on activities of daily living 
is only one of several criteria that an ALJ examines.  See Blackburn v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 
853, 858-59 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing criteria and how they are satisfied).  Here, the 
ALJ properly examined all of the criteria and concluded that Minch did not satisfy any of 
them.   
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F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that ALJs routinely pose hypothetical questions 
to vocational experts in order to determine a claimant’s ability to perform alternative 
employment).  The expert testified that a hypothetical individual of Minch’s age, 
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity could perform certain light 
work in unskilled positions that do not require face-to-face contact with the public, work 
as part of a team, or frequent interaction with a supervisor.  When asked by the ALJ 
whether such an individual could perform “work which is not repetitive in nature, … in 
an effort for the person not to be performing the same movement with their body over 
and over again all day long,” the expert stated that there were no such entry level 
positions available.  Minch faults the ALJ for “disregard[ing]” the answer to the latter 
hypothetical question.  Notably, however, the record did not credibly establish that 
Minch’s limitations required that he perform non-repetitive movements.  Therefore, the 
ALJ properly did not rely on that response.  Cf. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 
554 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that the “ALJ must accurately convey to the vocational expert 
all of a claimant's credibly established limitations.”).  
 For these reasons, and in light of our overall examination of the record, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
